






This is the author-version of article published as: 
 
Potts, Jason (2006) How Creative are the Super-Rich?. Agenda 13(4):pp. 339-350.. 
 
Accessed from   http://eprints.qut.edu.au 
 
 









Agenda, Volume 13, Number 4, 2006, pages 339-350 
How Creative are the Super-Rich? 
Jason Potts  
his paper seeks to analyse the contribution of the ‘creative industries’ to the 
ranks of the super-rich.  Rich list 2005-6 data for Australia and several 
other countries, indicate that while the creative industries represent only a 
small share of aggregate income (about five per cent) and an even smaller share of 
the largest national and global companies, they are disproportionately represented 
as generators of extreme personal wealth (about 10 per cent) and even more-so for 
the young rich (approximately one-third).  Young fortunes are the stand-out 
feature of the creative industries from this perspective, and a tangible sign of their 
economic significance in both an open economy and an open society.  The paper 
seeks to explain, from the evolutionary economic perspective, what this empirical 
finding might mean for public policy.   
T 
Creative Industries 
The concept of creative industries originates from a disparate group of economists, 
economic geographers and cultural and media studies academics who have sought 
to unify the theories of economic, regional and cultural growth into a single open-
system analytic framework (Caves, 2000; Howkins, 2001; Florida, 2002; Hartley, 
2005; Garnham, 2005; Cunningham, 2004, 2006).  The creative industries are 
therein defined as the set of industries that have their ‘origin in individual 
creativity, skill and talent, and which have a potential for wealth and job creation 
through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property’ (Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport, 2001).  This definition is still somewhat unsettled, but 
typically includes the Standard Industrial Classifications of: architecture, 
advertising, art, crafts, design, fashion, film, music, performing arts, publishing, 
research and development, software, toys and games, TV and video games.  The 
creative industries are defined by a common input — creativity — and a common 
output — novel content or intellectual property.   
Many elements of this classification have been around for a long time.  What 
is interesting about them now, however, is that they seem to be experiencing a 
profound change in economic significance due to the confluence of widespread 
adoption of digital technologies, high levels of mass education, and easier access 
to global information and markets.  Recent analysis for the UK, for example, 
estimates the growth rate of real value added of the creative industries sector at 
about six per cent, which is twice the growth rate of the aggregate economy 
(Department of Culture, Media and Sport, 2006).   
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Yet just as interesting from an evolutionary perspective is the relative 
performance of creative industries entrepreneurs in rich lists, and the implications 
this has for understanding the growing significance of this composite sector.  It is 
hoped that the unpacking of the sectoral composition of the upper extreme of 
personal wealth, will help to better explain the dynamic economic and policy 
significance of the creative industries, not just to static welfare, which has been the 
mandate of cultural economics (for example, Throsby, 1994, 2006), but as a driver 
of economic growth and transformation (Cowan, 2002; Cunningham, 2006; Potts, 
2006). 
The creative industries are tricky to analyse with normal economic data, as 
they cut across standard industry classifications (Creative Industries Research and 
Applications Centre, 2004).  As with all of the service sector, aggregate labour 
productivity, for example, is difficult to measure in this sector, and with the 
exception of huge media companies, creative industries companies tend to be 
small and fast changing in structure and size (De Vany, 2004).  Furthermore, the 
creative industries tend to be highly concentrated in major global cities due to the 
benefits of a concentration of creative talent and elite consumers, making them 
significant drivers of urban development independent of the location of big firms 
(Florida, 2002).  Moreover, creative industries’ products are not so much mass-
produced as mass-accessed (often at negligible marginal cost) as their outputs are 
by definition sui generis (Rifkin, 2000; Caves, 2000).   
For example, a creative industries producer such as pop star Madonna earns 
significant Schumpeterian profits from a portfolio of monopoly rents created with 
very little physical capital in a highly competitive industry.  Madonna is not a 
global corporation, nor a timeless industrial sector, and it is unlikely she directly 
employs more than a handful of people.  Yet like the Beatles before her, or the 
boys from Google or YouTube, she has generated a vast flow of income through 
creative capital and enterprise.  By providing a window into the Schumpeterian 
profits in an economy as the reward for novelty, rich list data and analysis may 
help us to better understand how individual creativity can be harnessed to generate 
new sources of economic value, and extreme wealth in the process. 
Economics of Extreme Wealth 
Two explanations of extreme personal wealth are evident in modern economics.  
For neoclassical economists wealth accrues from rents to either, talent and skill, or 
from power, exclusion or other market imperfections.  The explanation of extreme 
wealth in neoclassical analysis is therefore logically the same as the explanation of 
poverty, namely market failure.  In evolutionary economics, however, vast wealth 
is analysed as the result of profit that accrues to the introduction of a valuable new 
idea into an open economic system; this is the return to entrepreneurship and 
innovation.  Extreme wealth is a function of the extent of the market, and when a 
good new idea is adopted on a global scale where price is everywhere greater than 
marginal cost, these profits can be considerable.   
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We often think of profits as earned only by firms, with individuals earning 
wages or rents.  But rich list data plainly indicate that the majority of extreme 
personal wealth is due to profit from entrepreneurship (Siegfried et al, 1995).  The 
aggregate effect of entrepreneurship is the continual transformation or evolution of 
the economic order.  Although this process of innovation occurs throughout the 
economy on all different scales, it has long been known that it tends to cluster in 
places, sectors and times about particular new technologies (Schumpeter, 1939; 
Dopfer and Potts, 2007).  Examples of this phenomenon include railways and steel 
in the late 19th century, radio in the 1930s, mass-production manufacturing in the 
1950s, micro-electronics in the 1960-70s, and finance and banking in the 1980s.  
These clusters of entrepreneurial activity resulted in a changed relative size and 
organisation of industries, new firms, and, often, the creation of immense new 
personal wealth (Freeman and Soete, 1997).   
Evolutionary economists tend to analyse this process in relation to differential 
growth rates of firms or industries (Metcalfe, 1998), but it may also be analysed 
through the differential accumulation of profit as personal wealth.  Yet despite 
their ubiquity in the business press (where they originate) rich lists have been little 
used in economic analysis beyond the work of John Siegfried et al (Siegfried and 
Roberts, 1991; Blitz and Siegfried, 1992; Siegfried and Round, 1994; Hazledine 
and Seigfreid, 1997) who used rich list data (initially from Money magazine) to 
identify the origins of concentrations of extreme wealth and to connect this to the 
study of the market process.  Their findings for Australia, the United Kingdom 
(UK), New Zealand (NZ) and the United States (US) were that, first, about one-
third of vast fortunes are inherited and two-thirds self-made, with the self-made 
proportion steadily increasing over the 20th century.  Of the extremely rich, most 
became so by enterprise rather than inheritance or roguery (see also Atkinson and 
Harrison, 1978; Kopczuk and Saez, 2004; Schneider, 2004; Atkinson and Leigh, 
2005).   
Second, fortunes are broadly distributed across all sectors of the economy, 
but with shifting concentrations (see also Rubenstein, 1981).  In the 1800s, for 
example, vast Australian fortunes were concentrated among pastoralists and 
merchants (see Rubinstein 2004; Leigh 2005).  Yet by 1958 these fortunes were 
disproportionately concentrated in manufacturing and by 1990 the concentration 
had shifted to financial services (Siegfried et al 1995).  This is prima facie 
evidence for economic evolution as an ongoing process of structural 
transformation through the emergence and growth of new industries and the 
induced decline in significance of other industries.  Indeed, casual inspection of 
any rich list will often reveal people integral to the founding of a new industry or 
the creation of a new mass market (for example, Henry Ford, Steve Jobs, Rupert 
Murdoch).   
Third, and most importantly, approximately three-quarters of large fortunes 
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(1995:285) attribute this to the normal working of the competitive process, noting 
that  
a good number of the great fortunes in the world have accrued to 
individuals who first recognized an opportunity.  Many of the 
competitive entrepreneurial fortunes fit the Schumpeterian 
characterisation of competition as a process of creative destruction, with 
new products replacing old ones.  These are essentially disequilibrium 
fortunes.   
By offering an analysis of the extreme tail of the income distribution, rich 
lists shed light on the processes of growth and development.   
Data and Classification 
Several rich lists were analysed.  For Australia, the lists used are:  the Business 
Review Weekly top 500 public and private companies in 2005; the richest 200 
individuals and families in 2005; and the young rich (top 100 aged 40 and under) 
for 2004 and 2006.  New Zealand data come from National Business Review for 
2005 (cut-off $15 million).  For the UK, the data come from the Sunday Times 
richest 500 for 2005 (minimum £100 million) and the young rich list for 2006 
(compiled for the richest 100 aged 30 and under).  For the US, the data come from 
the Forbes 400 for 2006 (beginning at $900 million).  Global company data was 
derived from the Forbes 2000 for 2006, and young billionaires were derived from 
Forbes lists for 2006.  Note that no young rich data are available for the US and 
NZ.  Except for the company lists, the figures presented are shares (not count data, 
although these produce similar results) of the percentage of wealth held by 
creative industries entrepreneurs over the population of the entire list, with 
inherited fortunes excluded.   
Rich lists are compiled by business magazines though subcontracted research 
organisations (IbisWorld, Reuters, Bloomberg, Exshare, Thomson IBES, FT data, 
et al) and are constructed from public records and business intelligence (including 
interviews).  There are two main limitations of rich lists.  First, they are biased 
toward new fortunes in single businesses and against more diffuse holdings (as for 
example over an extended family).  Second, they tend to underestimate the extent 
of distributed or concealed wealth.  However, these problems are mostly in the 
realm of inherited fortunes, which are excluded from our analysis.  Despite these 
limitations, rich lists are widely acknowledged to be sufficiently complete for 
comparative analysis (Siegfried and Round, 1994; Gilding, 1999; Stilwell and 
Ansari, 2004).   
Yet the main problem with rich lists for this analysis, however, is that 
‘creative industries’ is a new and somewhat unsettled classification (compare, for 
example, Caves, 2000; Howkins, 2001; and Florida, 2002) that does not conform 
neatly to the Standard Industrial Classifications system, nor to the truncated 
classifications the magazines and newspapers tend to use.  The rich lists must 
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therefore be re-interpreted as follows.  The creative industries are not identical to 
the ‘cultural industries’, or to the ‘cultural and recreational services’ classification 
standard in rich lists.  We exclude all sports as they rely on skill, not creativity, 
casinos and racing (luck not creativity), and tourism and heritage wealth (physical 
or cultural asset, not creativity).  From the software and technology category, we 
exclude all infrastructure and hardware, but include the design contribution to 
consumer applications (that is, engineering for human-product systems, not just 
engineering a technical system).  From the ‘media’ category, we exclude all 
infrastructure providers and include only content providers.  Printers are excluded 
but publishers are in.  Retail with substantial design aspects are included (for 
example, fashion companies), but most retail is excluded (for example, 
supermarkets).  Entertainers are included (for example, actors, musicians), but 
sports stars (who make their money through media) are excluded.  Although 
undeniably creative in some measure, we do not include financial, insurance or 
banking companies, or business consultants and services.  This transformation and 
re-classification of the rich lists was performed through individual inspection of 
the companies or individuals through the profiles provided by the magazines and 
through further research based on company websites.   
Results 
The creative industries’ share of GDP, of the largest companies, of all personal 
fortunes and of the young rich is summarized in Table 1 below.   
Table 1:  Creative Industry Shares 
Country Economy Largest Firms All Rich Young Rich 
Australia 4.5-6% 3.7% (by count) 9.0% 
(8.5% by count) 
35.4% 
(37-37.5% by count) 
NZ 3.1% – 9.1% 
(9.5% by count) 
NA 
UK 7.9% – 12.9% 
(12.6% by count) 
36% 




(12.5% by count) 
NA 
World 4% 3.5% (by count) 25.0% 
(24% by count) 
39% 
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The share of the creative industries as a proportion of GDP provides our 
benchmark for comparing the proportion of creative industries in the rich lists.  
These estimates lie between 2.4-7.9 per cent with the differences due to both the 
different relative sizes of creative industries and also to different definitions.  The 
NZ and US estimates are defined so as to exclude software, R&D, advertising, 
games and architecture.  This is a significant exclusion for the US, yet no 
comparable figures to the Australian and UK estimates currently exists (cf.  
Florida 2002).  The 4.5 per cent figure for Australia represents the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport classification by sector.  The higher figure of six per 
cent share of GDP for Australia includes both the creative industries themselves 
and creative workers embedded in other sectors (for example, graphic designers or 
writers working for banks).  The UK estimate of 7.9 per cent is similarly 
composed.  Each of these figures was compiled by a research agency associated 
with the creative industries in the respective country and is presented here only for 
comparison with the rich list data. 
We first consider large companies.  The Forbes 2000 is a global list compiled 
as a composite index.  There were 75 creative industries firms in the top 2000 
(3.75 per cent), 51 of which were media companies, 19 in software and just five 
collectively in design (Swatch), fashion (Christian Dior, Ralph Lauren), 
publishing (Elsevier) and games (Electronic Arts).  By any account, the creative 
industries are not significantly represented in the world’s biggest businesses.  As 
something of an aside, note that 15.5 per cent of the Forbes 2000 companies can 
nevertheless be considered significant users of creative industries services such as 
design, fashion and advertising in the development and sale of products.  
Obviously, only a fraction of the value created by these companies can be 
attributed to this input.   
While almost an order of magnitude shorter than the global list, the same 
pattern is observed in both public and private Australian firms.  For 2006 there 
were just seven creative industries among the top 500 private companies, and of 
the top 500 public companies 30 were in creative industries (six per cent), and half 
of these were media companies.  However, the count of embedded creative 
industries (CI) companies or companies that contract-in CI services was only 25 
(five per cent).  This is significantly lower than in the global 2000 list because of 
the lower proportion of manufacturing and retail companies among the biggest 
Australian private companies.   
Of the 200 richest Australians in 2006, 59 were in property; 29 in retail; 16 in 
manufacturing; 11 in resources; nine in media (including four billionaires); six in 
software and technology, and three in entertainment.  Excluding one software and 
technology company as an Internet Service Provider yields a creative industries 
count of 17, equating to a nine per cent share of the total wealth held by these 
individuals.   
Of the 222 richest New Zealanders in 2005 21 were in the creative industries 
(including six in software, and all under 40), collectively holding 9.1 per cent of 
the total listed wealth.  Entertainment and the arts accounted for over half (11) of 
the creative entrepreneurs, which is unusually high, and it is also worth noting that 
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there were no publishing or network media fortunes.  The New Zealand rich list 
has proportionately more content providers than aggregators as compared to 
Australia.   
The Sunday Times rich list of the 500 richest Britons for 2005 contains 63 
creative industries entrants, representing 12.9 per cent of the total list wealth.  This 
figure is somewhat differently composed to both the Australian, global and US 
distribution, with a significant portion of individual musicians, actors and 
entertainers.  It also contains the only advertising fortune yet observed (Saatchi).  
A large number of publishing and fashion fortunes are evident in this list (29 per 
cent of the CI list), but relatively few software and technology fortunes (just under 
10 per cent of the CI list).   
Of the Forbes 400 richest Americans in 2006, 50 are in the creative industries 
(12.5 per cent by count, 14.2 per cent by share of wealth).  The distribution of 
creative industries fortunes is heavily skewed toward the top 100 of which 24 per 
cent are creative industries fortunes.  This skew is greater than we observe in 
Australia and broadly reflects the enormous cultural and media empires and 
exports associated with Hollywood, as well as television stars (for example, Oprah 
Winfrey, Martha Stewart) and the significant presence of young software 
billionaires (the owners of companies such as Yahoo, Google, and eBay). 
Interestingly, the global rich list of the top 100 personal fortunes (Forbes), of 
which entry to the list begins at US$6 billion, comprises 24 per cent creative 
industries by count and 25 per cent by share, and is almost exclusively comprised 
of software and media fortunes.  However for the top 500 this falls to 15 per cent 
by count, which can be attributed to the effect of multigenerational ‘old economy’ 
fortunes reasserting themselves.  Nevertheless, this plainly signals the global 
significance of the creative industries to the composition of the new economic 
order.   
Creative Industries and the Young Rich 
In the past few years, rich list providers have begun to track a separate list of 
young rich aged 40 and under.  As one would expect, the young list has a lower 
minimum wealth and ends well below the top of the ‘adult’ list.  Although the lists 
share important similarities — both have about the same ratio of inherited to self-
made wealth and the same range over all industries — the notable difference is in 
the distribution within those industries.  In essence, the young rich are much more 
significantly drawn from the creative industries than their adult brethren.   
First, consider the list of the world’s billionaires aged 40 and under according 
to Forbes.  There were 46, of which 19 inherited wealth, leaving 27 self-made.  Of 
the 27, eight were young Russians obtaining fortunes in metals and oil (30 per 
cent).  Of the remainder, two fortunes came from finance, two from retail, three 
from online gambling, four from core CI (including JK Rowling), six from 
software (including eBay, Yahoo and Google) which are among a total of 10 
based around the internet, with the remainder from transport and manufacturing.  
The implication is that 39 per cent of the total self-made wealth of the world’s 
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young billionaires originated in the creative industries.  Beyond hopes of 
spectacular inheritance or going boldly into Russian primary industries (together 
59 per cent of origin), the creative industries are the best launching platform to a 
fast billion or so — next best is gambling and finance. 
The BRW Australian young rich list compiles only self-made wealth and 
contains no billionaires.  The wealth of the top 100 individuals for 2006 ranged 
from $12 million to $260 million.  Retail, technology, services, entertainment, 
sport and media account for 78 per cent of young fortunes, with only 18 per cent 
from manufacturing, resources, or property.  This is the inverse of what we 
observe in both the largest public and private companies, as well as in the industry 
distribution of the adult rich.  Sports stars accounted for 10 per cent of the young 
rich and are not included in the creative industries, but nine per cent were 
entertainers, 10 per cent developed new software, 11 per cent were in fashion or 
design and six per cent were in new media.  Overall, 37 per cent made their 
fortune in the creative industries.  This wealth sums to a total creative industries 
wealth of $1.52 billion from $4.3 billion (35 per cent).  The 2004 young rich list in 
Australia was very similar, with 37.5 per cent of total list wealth generated in the 
creative industries.   
The Sunday Times young rich list for 2006 was compiled with a cut-off of 
age 30 or less, and so has less trading companies (and a notable absence of 
software and technology) and a preponderance of music, fashion and film wealth.  
Sports stars were excluded (28 per cent of the list), but creative industries 
additionally represented a 36 per cent share of top 100 wealth.   
In sum, for 2005-6 the economic significance of the creative industries by 
aggregate employment and income is about five per cent.  However, as a source of 
extreme personal wealth in nations this figure rises to about 10 per cent.  These 
fortunes overwhelmingly originated in competitive industries and were often 
associated with the development of new market niches.  This view from the tail 
clearly indicates that the creative industries are significant generators of new 
wealth.  However, the most striking observation is the much greater significance 
of the CIs to ‘young wealth’ as compared to ‘old wealth’.  One in three young 
Australian and UK fortunes originated in the creative industries, compared with 
one in ten for the ‘adult’ lists.   
What Will they Get-up to Next? 
Why is this happening?  One reason is that the barriers to entry in the creative 
industries are much lower than in other sectors, as most of the capital required is 
carried as talent and imagination, or, as economists like to say, as ‘human capital’.  
A second reason is that creative industry entrepreneurs and artists can tap into 
global financial and consumer markets with more ease now than in the past.  
Indeed, well over half of the Australian young rich appear to have made their 
fortune in global markets.  This is the same pattern observed in other countries (for 
example, US, UK, NZ) that share an institutional framework that promotes 
creative enterprise on a level playing field (Cowan 2002).  It is certainly not 
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unreasonable to evaluate the success of such a system by its ability to generate 
extreme personal wealth, and by this measure the Australian system is clearly 
working. 
The difference in age profiles in the concentration of creative fortunes 
highlights an interesting observation on the modern origins of new wealth.  In the 
past, great fortunes came from resources and manufacturing.  But there has been a 
recent and profound shift in the creation of value from engineering things to 
engineering information (Leadbeater, 2000; Florida, 2002).  The creative 
industries fortunes are in the space of media, fashion, software and design and 
about the provision of content to the solution of problems.  It is already well-
known that the creative industries are growing faster in aggregate than the 
economy-wide average (as part of the general rise of the service sector).  To this 
can be added the further observation that the extremes of wealth in this sector are 
leading the charge through the design of new businesses to connect new 
technologies to new markets.  This is the ‘creative edge’ of the evolutionary 
transformation of the economic order.   
Yet modern analysis of economic change is almost entirely based on the 
concept of ‘economic significance’ as represented by aggregate measures of the 
income, exports or employment that a particular industry generates.  This method 
is applied to both mature industries (for example, broad-acres agriculture, auto 
manufacture, leisure tourism) and new industries (for example, wine, avionics, 
digital games) to generate a distribution of public policy attention appropriate to 
the varying degrees of economic significance so found.  Big or prominent 
industries get more attention, small or diffuse industries get less.  This is of course 
a sensible method for calibrating industry, trade, innovation or competition policy 
to an economy in equilibrium, yet it can be seriously misleading when applied to a 
context in which new industries are continually emerging and extant industries are 
continually transforming as new technologies are differentially adopted and the 
boundaries between industries themselves become less distinct (Baumol, 2002).  
For example, digitisation is transforming design from a subcomponent of 
manufacturing firms into an industry in its own right that extends deeply into the 
service sector (Creative Industries Research and Applications Centre, 2005), yet 
design does not figure in any of the industry development policies currently in 
place at the State or Federal level in Australia.   
The arrival of new industries and sources of economic value that drive 
continual endogenous transformation signals economic evolution, which is an 
entirely normal process in a modern market economy.  From the open system 
perspective, public policy must therefore seek to continually monitor and adapt to 
the ever-changing profiles of income, exports and employment that economic 
evolution engenders.  But to provide this sort of analysis, we must consider not 
just the aggregate averages of industry significance, but also the changing signals 
of emerging significance that derive from the tails of the distributions. 
The study of the extreme rich in the context of creative industries highlights a 
classification problem that bedevils cultural, media, industry and competition 
policy, namely the social value of creativity.  When viewed as cultural industries, 
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there is a well-worn argument that creative endeavours warrant public subsidy.  
Yet when re-conceptualized as the creative industries, we find an escalator to 
personal wealth.  Did the creative industries throw up so many young rich because 
of policy planning or in spite of it? Australia’s creative rich certainly may have 
benefited from public support of and merit based access to acting academies and 
universities, for example, and the relative ease of starting companies, hiring staff 
and protecting intellectual property is probably not insignificant to the creation of 
media and software fortunes.   
Yet there is little evidence for a catalytic role played by industry or cultural 
policy in generating these fortunes.  Indeed, it could be said that the recent rise of 
creative enterprise as a legitimate source of economic value and significant 
personal wealth has taken policy makers in these domains somewhat by surprise 
(Cunningham 2006).  The public policy attention that has been focused on the 
creative industries arose largely due to monitoring of average or aggregate 
measures, such as employment or trade figures, that are necessarily post hoc and 
therefore attain significance only after the early phases of industrial evolution have 
passed (see Ross, 2006-7).  Closer monitoring of not just relative growth rates but 
also new fortunes might have helped policy makers keep pace with industrial 
transformation in something at least closer to real time.  While it is not the purpose 
of government to render great fortunes for a handful of individuals, it is surely the 
job of policy to set the conditions for wealth creation through enterprise as widely 
as possible, by avoiding presumptions about the sectors or industries from which 
these structural developments may arise.  Analysis of rich lists can help here, by 
providing a window into the ever shifting space of opportunity that new 
technologies and markets bring.     
Political economists are sometimes wont to view rich lists as static emblems 
of the social injustice of a market economy.  But rich lists are interesting not 
because of the power structures they ostensibly represent — for they are 
transitory, disequilibrium phenomena — but rather for the forward insight they 
give through the early warning of new fortunes into the evolution of industries and 
markets.  The creative industries, in this view, are not the perpetual subsidy cases 
of the much maligned cultural industries, but a new and vibrant sector 
characterized by significant opportunities for rapid and global growth.  And so just 
as the business magazines that publish rich lists ostensibly justify such ‘business 
porn’ (that is, the solicitous display of naked wealth) by its educational value to 
aspiring entrepreneurs, so too may a better economic understanding of the nature 
and causes of extreme wealth be of educational value to policy makers.   
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